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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

DALE DEMONT HARDY,
Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010396-CA
Priority No. 2

Appellant Dale Hardy was criminally charged and convicted in two separate cases
of violating a protective order. The conviction in Case No. 991200131 ("Case No. 131")
was recorded as a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999), and
the two convictions in Case No. 991200873 ("Case No. 873") were recorded as third
degree felonies under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999). Hardy appealed from the entry
ofjudgment in both cases, and this Court consolidated the cases for the appeal.
The facts relevant to each case are the same. Hardy and his estranged wife,
Courtney, have four children. In January 1999, Courtney obtained a protective order
prohibiting Hardy from "directly or indirectly" contacting or communicating with her.
(Case No. 873, Exhibit P2.) The order allowed Hardy visitation with the children.
In January 1999, Hardy allegedly violated the protective order. (See Case No.
131:1-2.) In April 1999, he appeared before a trial judge on the violation and he agreed
to a plea in abeyance, where he would abstain from further violating the order for one
year. At the expiration of the year, the judge would enter a "not guilty" plea in the matter
and dismiss the case. (Case No. 131:8-12.)

In July 1999, the state alleged new violations of the protective order against Hardy
for mailing letters to his children. The children lived with Courtney. Based on evidence
of the letters, the judge in Case No. 131 withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a
guilty plea against Hardy for a misdemeanor offense; and he entered an order in Case No.
873, binding Hardy over for trial on the new violations. In August 2000, a jury convicted
Hardy of the new violations, which were entered as third degree felonies.
On appeal, Hardy is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in each case. That
analysis requires consideration of the criminal statutes at issue, Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-64.2(2)(b) (1998) and 76-5-108 (1999). Hardy maintains the letters he sent to his children
were not prohibited by the statutory provisions or the protective order. (Brief of
Appellant, Point I.) The convictions must be reversed.
In response to Hardy's claims, the state has identified the facts at trial, but has
failed to present legal analysis concerning the criminal statutory provisions at issue. (See
State's Brief of Appellee ("State's Brief), Point II.) In the end, there is a gap in the
state's evidence, as set forth in Hardy's opening brief and as further set forth herein.
Hardy requests that this Court reverse the convictions.
Hardy also is challenging the constitutionality of the criminal provisions at issue.
The provisions make it illegal for a "respondent" to directly/indirectly contact/communicate with a "petitioner," who has obtained a protective order. The statutory provisions fail
to define relevant terms and they serve to criminalize a potentially huge universe of
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innocent conduct. The criminal provisions are unconstitutional.
In response to Hardy's constitutional arguments, the state claims Hardy failed in
part to preserve his arguments, and he lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the provisions enforced against him. (State's Brief, Points III, IV, VI.) Those claims are
incorrect. In addition, the state addresses related but irrelevant provisions. In the end, the
state fails to engage in any pertinent discussion concerning the provisions that criminalize
direct/indirect contact/communication. The criminal provisions must be stricken.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE DOES NOT SERIOUSLY DEFEND THE
CONVICTIONS IT OBTAINED BELOW. THE SPARE BRIEFING ON
THE SUFFICIENCY ISSUES SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AS A
CONCESSION ON THE STATE'S PART. COMPELLING REVERSAL.
Utah appellate courts have specified that a sufficiency analysis begins with the
criminal statute at issue, where the court will look to the statute to identify the elements
that make up the offense.' Hardy has identified the relevant statutory provisions at issue
in this case. (Brief of Appellant, Point LA. (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-1, et. seq.
(1998); 76-5-108 (1999); and 77-36-1 (1999)). In sum, the Cohabitant Abuse Act allows
a "petitioner" to obtain a protective order against a "respondent." Among other things,
the order may prohibit the respondent from contacting or otherwise communicating with
1 See Brief of Appellant, 13 (citing State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1215 (Utah 1993);
State v.Merila. 966 P.2d 270,272 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Smith. 927 P.2d 649,651
(Utah App. 1996); State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 358-59 (Utah App. 1991); U.S. v. Cicco.
10 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Hollis. 971 F.2d 1441(10th Cir. 1992), cert,
denied. 507 U.S. 985 (1993); U.S. v. Levine. 41 F.3d 607,610-11 (10th Cir. 1994)).
3

the petitioner, either directly or indirectly. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-2; 30-6-4.2(2)(b).
According to Utah law, if the respondent intentionally or knowingly violates that
particular provision of the protective order, the state may criminally prosecute and punish
him for the violation. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i); 76-5-108; see infra.
note 5, herein; (Brief of Appellant, Point I.A.(1).).
In civil proceedings below, Courtney obtained a protective order against Hardy.
The order in relevant part prohibited Hardyfrom"contacting" or "otherwise
communicating" with her, "directly or indirectly." (Case No 873, Exhibit P2); Utah Code
Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(b). After officials served the order on Hardy, he mailed letters to his
children. Thereafter, Hardy was prosecuted for "communicating with" Courtney in
violation of the protective order, under §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108.
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, when the legislature enacted § 30-64.2(2)(b) it failed to define relevant terms. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.A.(2).) Specifically, the legislature failed to define "contacting," "otherwise communicating," "directly"
or "indirectly." (Id,) Thus, Hardy has asked this Court to use the traditional tools of
statutory construction to define those terms and to interpret the statute as follows: Before
the state may obtain a criminal conviction for a violation of the protective order as set
forth at § 30-6-4.2(2)(b), it must prove that the contact/communication was violent,
abusive, threatening, or harassing to the petitioner. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.A.(3).)
The state does not take issue with that interpretation. (See State's Brief, Points I &
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II.) Indeed, the state has not discussed the relevant statutory terms in its analysis. (See
State's Brief, Points I & II.) In addition, in response to Hardy's argument concerning the
felony convictions, the state does not dispute that the prosecutor failed to present
evidence to support that the letters were a contact or communication with Courtney.
(State's Brief, Point II.) For the reasons more fully set forth in Hardy's opening brief and
below, Hardy is entitled to an order reversing the convictions.
A. IN ITS ANALYSIS CONCERNING THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION. THE STATE SIMPLY
HAS CITED TO EVIDENCE THAT HARDY WROTE LETTERS TO HIS
CHILDREN. THAT IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A "CONTACT" OR
"COMMUNICATION" WITH COURTNEY.
In the sufficiency analysis for Case No. 131, the state asserts that the trial judge
properly withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a guilty plea against Hardy for
writing letters to his children. According to the state, those letters constituted a violation
of the permanent protective order, which prohibited Hardy from engaging in "any contact
or communication with his estranged wife." (See State's Brief, 13.) The state claims the
following facts support the determination that Hardy "intended the letters [to be] for
[Courtney], even though [Hardy] addressed them to his children" (id , 15):
"[Defendant wrote two letters [dated June 7 and June 24] addressed to his children
at the residence they shared with [Courtney]."
*

*

*

M

[T]he oldest of [the] four children was eight at the time and had a form of autism.
T. 93:11. The other three children were six and under. T. 93:10-11. None of the
children read at the time they received the letters. T. 93:12."
(State's Brief, 13,14.)
5

In its sufficiency analysis, the state also alludes to the alleged "content of the
letters - the focus on marital problems, the references to prior marital conversations, and
the implicit accusations of blame." (State's Brief, 14; but see the Letters at Case No. 873,
Exhibits P10 and PI 1.) That is the total evidence identified by the state to support a
violation of the protective order.2
The state does not dispute the following: the record fails to support that the letters
were harassing, threatening, abusive or violent; and it fails to support that the letters
constituted a danger of abuse or manipulation to Courtney. Also, the record fails to
support any "veiled threat[] and/or harassment." (See State's Brief, 21.) The criminal
provisions set forth at §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 should not be construed to
apply here, where there is no evidence of criminally offensive conduct. (See Brief of
Appellant, Points I & II; infra. Point II, below.) The evidence is insufficient to support
withdrawal of the plea in abeyance and entry of the misdemeanor conviction.
B. IN ITS ANALYSIS FOR THE FELONY CONVICTIONS, THE STATE
DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT IT FAILED TO MAKE ANY CONNECTION
BETWEEN THE LETTERS AND COURTNEY.
In response to Hardy's sufficiency argument as it relates to the felony convictions
(Case No. 873), the state claims the following evidence was presented to the jury to
support that Hardy contacted, or otherwise communicated with Courtney, directly or

2 The state also makes reference to the prosecutor's argument in the lower court that "the
letters were intended for Ms. Hardy." (State's Brief, 14.) Counsel's argument is not
evidence. See State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990).
6

indirectly, in violation of §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108:
At trial, the jury heard evidence of the children's ages and their inability to read.
T. 178:85-86. The June 7 and June 24 letters were entered into evidence and their
mature content highlighted. T. 178:112-116. In addition, police officers testified
that on two different occasions they explained to defendant that he could not write
letters to his wife. T. 178:67-69,76-77.
(State's Brief, 15.)
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, that evidence is insufficient. M[T]here [is] an
evidentiary void in the state's case." (Brief of Appellant, 25.)
The state failed to present evidence to support that the letters were
somehow for Courtney. Specifically, there is no indication on the face of the
letters that they were a form of communication or contact intended for Courtney,
directly or indirectly, where the letters were addressed to the children.
(See Exhibit P10 and PI 1.) In addition, the state failed to show that any part of
either letter constituted a contact/communication with Courtney. That is, the state
failed to show that Hardy expected the children to communicate any part of the
letters to Courtney; it failed to show that Hardy otherwise used the children to
communicate indirectly with Courtney; and it failed to show that the letters were in
any way for Courtney's benefit. (Case No. 873 at 178.)
Further, there is no indication that Courtney believed the letters were
intended for her, either directly or indirectly (see Case No. 873 at 178:111-18,12324, (Courtney's testimony regarding the June 7 and 24 letters)). * * *
Finally, based on the evidence presented at trial in this case, it would be
inappropriate for the jury to infer that the letters were for Courtney. Specifically,
evidence was presented to support that the letters were for the children at a later
date, when they could understand the content. (See Case No. 873 at 178:129
(Courtney testified the children eventually probably would be able to understand
the letters).) While the jury was at liberty to disregard Courtney's testimony to
that effect, such disregard simply would create a void in the matter. The record
still lacked evidence to support that the letters were for Courtney.
(Brief of Appellant, 25-26 (note and cites omitted).)
In sum, evidence that the letters contained mature content for the children at their
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current ages was insufficient. Section 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order did not prohibit Hardy from sending letters to the children discussing his feelings. The evidence
fails to support that Hardy contacted or communicated with Courtney. The felony
convictions must be reversed. (Brief of Appellant, Point I.B.(l).)
POINT II. IN RESPONSE TO HARDY'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 30-6-4.2(2Vb) AS A CRIMINAL
PROVISION. THE STATE HAS DISCUSSED THE PURPOSE SERVED BY
THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. WHICH IS NOT IN ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
AND IT HAS RAISED INAPPLICABLE PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS.
This Court may avoid the constitutional issues raised on appeal by resolving the
sufficiency issues above in Hardy's favor. In the event this Courtfindsthat the evidence
was insufficient to support the convictions, this Court will not need to address the
remaining claims. See Merila. 966 P.2d at 273 (in view of the Court's opinion on the sufficiency issue, "we need not address the other arguments raised on appeal"); Provo City v.
Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^J16,1 P.3d 1113 (where court resolved a dispositive issue in
favor of defense, it was not necessary to reach remaining issues on appeal).
In the event this Court upholds the convictions, Hardy maintains that the statutory
provisions defining the criminal conduct here are unconstitutional. (See Brief of
Appellant, Point II.) The provisions that serve to criminally penalize the defendant are
vague, ambiguous and overbroad, in violation of the due process clause of the federal
constitution, and in violation of the First Amendment. They must be stricken.
In response to Hardy's constitutional claims, the state has made procedural
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arguments and it has defended legislation relating to the initial entry of a protective order
in civil proceedings. (See State's Brief, 20-21 (discussing the purpose of protective
orders).) Those arguments are irrelevant. The issues in this case relate to the criminal
provisions. Hardy is attacking the broad, sweeping provisions that allow the state to
criminally punish him for innocuous letters. (See State's Brief, 19 (recognizing that
Hardy is challenging the provisions that subject him to criminal punishment for letters
that express "sorrow, remorse and devotion").) For the reasons set forth below, this Court
should disregard the state's brief as it relates to the constitutional issues.
A. THE STATE'S OVERBREADTH ARGUMENT DOES NOT ADDRESS
THE CRIMINAL ASPECTS OF THE PROVISIONS AT ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, the legislature may regulate conduct and
speech that is harassing, violent, abusive, threatening, libelous, or obscene, or that constitutes extortion, perjury, conspiracy, or fraud.3 The legislature may not enact broad
criminal provisions that sweep within their ambit innocent conduct.
In Hardy's opening brief, he argued the following:
Assuming arguendo the Cohabitant Abuse Act serves to protect petitioners — who
are reasonably in fear of physical harm —fromdomestic abuse, intimidation,
violence, threats, and harassment, Hardy maintains that relevant portions of § 306-4.2(2)(b) and the protective order are not carefully drawn so as to serve that
purpose. Rather, the provisions are so broadly worded that they sweep within their
ambit protected communication.

3 See Brief of Appellant, 42 (citing Whatcott 2000 UT App 86,1J10; State v. Brown,
748 P.2d 276,279 (Wash. App. 1988); State v. Chung. 862 P.2d 1063,1072 (Haw. 1993);
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Roth v.
IIS,, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)).
9

On the face of § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) there is no attempt to distinguish between
criminal communication or contact, and innocent communication or contact. That
is, whether the communications are intimidating, threatening, abusive, violent or
harassing; whether they engender fear; whether they constitute "fighting words";
or whether they relate to health insurance or visitation issues concerning the
children, they are all treated alike, subject to criminal prosecution and penalty
under § 30-6-4.2(2)(b). Further there is no attempt to distinguish between
communications in public places (i.e. in a court conference room with an attorney)
and communications at or in the sanctity of the petitioner's residence.
Indeed, the phrase that prohibits direct/indirect communication/contact
cannot be said "sufficiently to inform the ordinary person" that the statute is meant
to distinguish between "allowable areajs] of state control" and "activities that in
ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise offreedomof speech." On that
basis, the language is overly broad.
(Brief of Appellant, 45-46 (cites omitted)); (State's Brief, 20 (recognizing that a statute is
overbroad if it criminalizes constitutionally protected activity).)4
In response to Hardy's argument, the state claims that the Cohabitant Abuse Act,
which authorizes protective orders, was carefully tailored to protect petitionersfromabusive/violent conduct. The state also discusses the purposes served with the entry of a protective order. (State's Brief, 20-22 (court may enter protective order to avoid abuse).)
The state claims that in connection with entering a protective order, a trial court may restrict contact/communication between the petitioner and respondent. (State's Brief, 21.)
Hardy does not take issue with the provisions that allow for the entry of a

4 Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) allows a court to enter a protective order prohibiting
respondent from "contacting" or "otherwise communicating" with petitioner, either
"directly or indirectly." Sections 76-5-108 and 30-6-4.2(5)(a)(i) specify that a violation
of subsection (2)(b) shall constitute a criminal offense. Since subsection (2)(b) actually
defines the criminal conduct at issue, Hardy has attacked that specific provision as
unconstitutional. It is overly broad, vague and ambiguous. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.)
10

protective order. Indeed, a civil court has discretion to enter such an order. According to
§ 30-6-4.2, a court may enter a protective order for "any further relief that the court
considers necessary to provide for the safety and welfare of the petitioner and any
designated family or household member." Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(g). In addition,
Hardy does not take issue here with the fact that a protective order was entered in the civil
case, Hardv v. Hardv. Case No. 994900133CA. (Case No. 873, Exhibit P2.)
Hardy's appeal relates to the provisions that define criminal conduct and were used
by the prosecutor to obtain convictions in Case Nos. 131 and 873.
After the civil court entered a protective order in Hardy v. Hardy, the state filed
criminal charges against Hardy for writing letters to his children. The state alleged that
Hardy violated the protective order, and it prosecuted him for the alleged offenses under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i), and 76-5-108. Those statutory provisions
make it a crime to violate certain portions of the protective order.5

5 According to the relevant statutory provisions, not all violations of the protective order
constitute a crime. If a respondent makes threats of violence or abuse or harasses the
petitioner, that conduct may be criminally prosecuted. Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(a),
(2)(b), (2)(c), (2)(d) (respondent's use of a weapon that threatens petitioner constitutes a
crime), (5)(a)(i); 76-5-106 (1999) (defining "harassment"). If the respondent denies the
petitioner the use/possession of certain marital assets, that conduct may be criminally
prosecuted. Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-4.2(2)(e), (5)(a)(i).
Other violations of the protective order constitute a "civil violation," which will
subject the respondent to "contempt proceedings." For example, if the respondent
violates the child custody provisions, or the provision that affords "further relief1 for the
safety and welfare of the petitioner and family, that conduct will constitute a civil
violation. Id at -4.2(2)(f), (g), (5)(a)(ii).
While the general language of § 76-5-108 makes it criminal for a respondent to
intentionally/knowingly violate a protective order, not every violation is a crime. The
11

Thus, while the civil court may have acted properly in granting a protective order
in Hardy v. Hardy* that does not address the constitutionality of the criminal provisions
used to prosecute and punish Hardy. The legislature has used § 30-6-4.2(2)(b) and the
protective order to define an offense in such broad terms, that the provisions embrace and
criminalize innocent conduct. Here, Hardy was criminally convicted under broadly
worded provisions for innocuous letters to his children. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.)
In further response to Hardy's constitutional arguments, the state seems to claim
that the criminal provisions at issue here are proper because they prevent communications
"that may appear innocent, but in fact [are] not." (State's Brief, 21.) Also, the state
seems to claim that the provisions criminalize contacts/communications that "may
constitute veiled threats; and/or harassment" or that may "escalate into abuse." (Id.)
Assuming, arguendo, the state is correct and the criminal provisions were meant to
apply in those limited circumstances, the provisions here are overbroad where they also
criminalize communications that are innocent. That is unconstitutional. (Brief of
Appellant, Point II.) Stated another way, in Hardy's opening brief, he argued that this
Court may interpret the statutory provisions at issue to apply only when the state has
established that the contact/communication at issue constitutes a threat, harassment,

specific language of § 30-6-4.2(5)(a)(i) identifies when a criminal violation of a
protective order occurs. Utah courts have ruled that specific statutory provisions govern
over general provisions. See State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412,414 (Utah 1994) (specific
statute controls over general statute). Thus, a criminal violation occurs when §§ 30-64.2(5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 are read together, in harmony.
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abuse, or violence. Such an interpretation will avoid constitutional difficulties. (See Brief
of Appellant, Point I.A.(3).) Unless the prosecutor is held to such proof, the relevant
provisions fail to distinguish between communications that "may appear innocent" but "in
fact [are] not" (State's Brief, 21), and communications that in fact are innocent.
Indeed, as they stand, the criminal provisions at issue here are so broadly worded
that they fail to distinguish between innocent communications versus veiled threats. They
sweep within their ambit "a potentially huge universe of otherwise legitimate" conduct.
Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^[11. The provisions are unconstitutionally overbroad.
Next, the state justifies the broadly-worded provisions by claiming it has "a legitimate interest in "preserving the sanctity of the home, the one retreat to which men and
women can repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits.'" (State's Brief,
21.) In support of that claim, the state has cited to Frisbv v. Schultz. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
That case is inapplicable. It concerns restrictions on free speech in a "public forum."
In Frisbv. abortion protestors challenged an ordinance that banned picketing in a
residential area. The ordinance prohibited the protestorsfrompicketing outside a
doctor's home. WL at 476. The Court upheld the regulation on the basis that it did not
single out any particular person or group in its prohibitions, it did not ban picketers in
general from residential areas, and it allowed picketers to deliver their message in the
residential area in other ways. See id. at 483-84,6 Also, the prohibition served a

6 The Supreme Court found that the ordinance left open "ample alternative channels of
communication," Frisbv. 487 U.S. at 488, for picketers who wished to deliver their mes13

legitimate purpose: it kept picketersfromtrapping a person in his own home and
subjecting him to offensive speech, "The First Amendment permits the government to
prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the 'captive' audience cannot avoid the
objectionable speech." Id. at 487.
In upholding the ordinance, the Court in Frisby reiterated that while residential
sanctity is important, in other circumstances residents are responsible to "avoid speech
they do not want to hear." Id. at 484. The Court emphasized that it would strike a law
that completely banned expressive activity. Id at 485 (cites omitted).
The tensions between free speech in a "public forum" and residential sanctity identified in Frisbv are not relevant here. As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, the criminal
provisions here were not drafted to restrict communications that interfered with the sanctity of the home. That is, under §§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108, a respondent is
subjected to criminal prosecution whether he communicates child custody issues or health
insurance concerns with the petitioner at home, on di public street, or in a court conference
room, face-to-face or through a third party. (See Brief of Appellant, 45.) The criminal
provisions are all-encompassing. They prohibit all communications, including innocent
communications, and communications that are not directed at the petitioner.
The provisions here do not implicate the "public forum" analysis identified in

sage to residents. For example, while the picketers would be prohibited from gathering
outside the doctor's home and subjecting him to their offensive message, the picketers
could distribute literature or use the mails to deliver the same message. Id at 484.
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Frisby. See Reno v.ACLlL 521 U.S. 844, 859, 871-72, 879-80 (1997) (broadly worded
provisions that prohibited "obscene" or "indecent" messages were unconstitutional under
the overbreadth/vagueness analysis; the "time, place, and manner" analysis for speech in a
"public forum" was inapplicable and would not save the provisions).7
Under the proper analysis, state and federal courts recently have stricken criminal
provisions that were overly broad, even though such provisions arguably preserved
sanctity in the home. See Whatcott 2000 UT App 86, ^[12 (striking broadly worded
telephone harassment statute, which would prohibit "unwanted telephone solicitations
made to a private home during the dinner hour"); Reno. 521 U.S. 844 (striking statute
seeking to protect minorsfromharmful materials).
Next, the state claims "individuals do not have an unfettered First Amendment
right to send letters to unwilling recipients... 4[A] mailer'srightto communicate must
stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive addressee.'" (State's Brief, 22.) Assuming,
arguendo, that is correct, it is irrelevant for several reasons. First, Hardy sent letters to
his children. There is no evidence to support they were "unwilling recipients."
Second, the state has cited to Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't 397 U.S. 728
(1970), in support of its proposition. (State's Brief, 22.) Rowan is inapplicable. There,

7 In any event, the criminal provisions here would fail the "public forum" analysis set
forth in Frisby because they do not leave open any "alternative forum" or channel of communication for the exchange of protected, innocent expressions or ideas. Pursuant to §§
30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108, a respondent is subjected to criminal prosecution
for all forms of communication with a petitioner, even "indirect" communication where
the respondent has used an attorney to deliver the message. (Brief of Appellant, Point II.)
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the Court considered a statute that insulated households from "lewd and salacious"
mailings. Rowan. 397 U.S. at 731. The statute required the Postmaster General, upon an
addressee's request, to order a "sender" to remove the addressee's namefromthe sender's mailing list. Id at 729-30. The government's role in the matter was limited. Id at
733-34. If the sender violated the order, the Postmaster General and district court could
conduct a hearing for entry of a compliance order. Id at 738-39. The analysis in Rowan
is irrelevant, since it does not concern criminal prosecution for sending unwanted mail.
Third, the state does not suggest in its brief that the Utah legislature enacted the
criminal provisions at issue in this case to cut down on unwanted mail. In fact, the provisions that define criminal conduct here are far more reaching. Sections 30-6-4.2(2)(b),
(5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 serve to criminally punish a respondent for face-to-face communications with the petitioner about such issues as health insurance; and communications
through a third party (indirect) about many innocuous matters.
In this case, the state has failed to identify a legitimate basis for criminally penalizing a respondent for all forms of contact/communication, including indirect, innocuous
communications. In addition, the state has failed to address the inconsistencies in Utah
law and the protective order, where a "respondent" may be required under the protective
order to cooperate with petitioner aboutfinancialissues, and simultaneously prosecuted
for communicating with the petitioner about such matters. (Brief of Appellant, 34-35.)
The state also has failed to show how the criminal provisions here were
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sufficiently tailored to ensure that they do not infringe on First Amendment rights.
In this case, Hardy was prosecuted under legislation that made it a crime to engage
in all forms of communication, direct and indirect, with a petitioner. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) & 76-5-108; (Case No 873, Exhibit P2). Although the letters
were innocuous and addressed to Hardy's children, the trial court considered them to be
sufficient to send the matter to the jury for a criminal verdict. In that regard, the trial
court endorsed a broad reading of the provisions. That reading ran afoul of the "wellestablished principle that statutes will be interpreted to avoid constitutional difficulties."
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 483. The criminal provisions must be stricken as overly broad.
B. ALTHOUGH THE STATE CLAIMS THE PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
ADEQUATELY DEFINE A CRIME. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY
WHAT THE RELEVANT TERMS MEAN.
Due process requires the legislature to define "a criminal offense with 'sufficient
defmiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."1 (State's
Brief, 24-25 (citing Salt Lake Citv v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259,1265 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)).)
Hardy maintains the criminal provisions at issue here violate due process.
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief and above, the legislature did not define the
terms "contacting," "communicating," "directly or indirectly," as those terms are used in
the criminal provisions. (Brief of Appellant, Points I.A.(2).) The state does not offer any
definitions. (See State's Brief, generally.)
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The legislature's failure to adequately define the terms prevented Hardy from
knowing what was prohibited by the statute so that he could act accordingly,8 and it
impermissibly delegated basic policy matters to the judge and jury for resolution on an ad
hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory
application. Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); State v. Blowers.
717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986) (finding due process violation where statute failed to
adequately define prohibited conduct); (Brief of Appellant, Point II.A. and B.).
The state disputes that the criminal provisions at issue are vague, and it asserts that
Hardy was adequately advised that communicating "to Ms. Hardy" would constitute an
offense. (State's Brief, 27.) That argument disregards that in this case, Hardy did not
communicate "to" or with Courtney. Rather, Hardy was prosecuted for sending letters to
his children about Courtney and his feelings. Application of the provisions in this case
violated due process. Blowers. 717 P.2d 1321.
The state also asserts that "defendant was not subjected] to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement" of the vague provisions in this matter, and "the jury was not asked to
decide" whether the criminal provisions could be construed to apply to the facts in this
case. (State's Brief, 27.) Again, the state's argument disregards proceedings in the lower
court. There, counsel for Hardy argued that because the June letters were addressed to
Hardy's children, there was no basis tofindthat the letters constituted a communication
8 Although Hardy was advised that he was prohibited from writing to Courtney, he was
not advised that he was prohibited from writing to his children for any reason.
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to Courtney. Hardy's counsel also argued that if the court considered the evidence to be
sufficient to send the matter to the jury, the protective order and relevant statutes were
unconstitutional as criminal provisions. (Case No. 873, R. 178:135-40); see Blower, 717
P.2d 1321 (defendant argued that if the statutory provisions, which prohibited driving
while under the influence, applied to riding a horse, they were unconstitutional).
The trial judge rejected Hardy's constitutional arguments concerning application
of the provisions and ruled that Hardy's arguments must be "made to the jury" in an effort
to convince the jury that the provisions did not reach the conduct. (Case No. 873, R.
178:140-41.) With that ruling, the trial court failed in its gate-keeping function. It
allowed the jury to consider the reach of the protective order and statutory provisions.
As set forth in Hardy's opening brief, the trial court gave the jury license to create
its own standard for determining whether the conduct was criminal under the relevant
provisions. That was improper. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court criticized such an approach in Gooding v. Wilson. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). There, the Court considered a statute
that made it unlawful to utter "opprobrious words or abusive language, tending to cause a
breach of the peace." Id. at 519. The Court found the statute unconstitutionally vague/
overbroad. It also took the Georgia Supreme Court to task for failing to limit the scope of
the statute, and for giving juries license to create their "own standard" for application of
the statute on a case-by-case basis. Id at 528 (cite omitted).
The criminal provisions at issue here are more troubling than the provisions in
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Gooding. The provisions here were used to criminalize Hardy's letters to his children,
containing expressions of remorse, information about friends, and a recipe for stuffed
trout. That is unconstitutional. "We conclude that '[t]he separation of legitimate from
illegitimate speech calls for more sensitive tools than [the lower court] has supplied.'"
Gooding. 405 U.S. at 528 (cite omitted). The trial court erred in allowing this case to go
to the jury. (See Brief of Appellant, Point II.B.)
C. THE STATE'S PRESERVATION AND STANDING ARGUMENTS LACK
MERIT.
(1) The Constitutional Challenges Were Properly Preserved.
According to the state, Hardy "has preserved his over breadth claim" as it relates to
"his felony convictions in Case No. 991200873." (State's Brief, 19.) The state asserts
Hardy failed to properly preserve the remaining constitutional issues. (See State's Brief,
Points III, IV.) The state's "wavier" arguments should be disregarded as follows.
(a) Case No. 873: With respect to the felony case, the state admits Hardy properly
preserved "over breadth." (State's Brief, 19.) Under the law, a provision that is overly
broad may also be vague. Indeed, a vague/overbroad provision fails to define relevant
terms, and it is not carefully tailored to reach only criminal conduct; it embraces innocent
conduct. Vagueness and overbreadth are related concepts.9

9 See Brief of Appellant, 31-32 (citing Reno. 521 U.S. at 871-72; Gravned. 408 U.S. at
108-09; Edwards v. Louisiana. 372 U.S. 229,236-37 (1963); State v. Pierson. 476
N.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Neb. 1991) (overbreadth embraces vagueness); Stock v. State. 526
P.2d 3,7-8 (Alaska 1974) ("overbreadth" is an aspect of the vagueness analysis)).
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Under the vagueness/overbreadth analysis, this Court will consider whether the
provisions at issue give a person of "ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited"; whether the provisions are sufficiently explicit to ensure
objective and uniform application; and whether the provisions "abut[] upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms." Gravned. 408 U.S. at 108-09. Where Hardy
properly challenged the provisions as overbroad and indefinite, this Court may consider
the matter under each prong of the Gravned analysis. (See Case No. 873, R. 178:135-42.)
(b) Case No. 131: The state claims Hardy failed to properly preserve the constitutional issues in the misdemeanor Case No. 131. This Court should disregard the state's
claim for at least three reasons. First, Case Nos. 131 and 873 are companion cases. Each
case involved the same parties and attorneys; the convictions were entered in each case
based on the same facts;10 the same judge entered judgment in each case; and the same
judge considered the constitutional arguments in each matter.11

10 In the misdemeanor case (Case No. 131), Hardy was charged with violating the protective order in January 1999. The trial judge agreed to hold a plea in abeyance for that
violation for a year so long as Hardy did not otherwise violate the protective order.
Thereafter, the state charged Hardy with the violations at issue in Case No. 873, for
mailing letters to his children in June 1999. Based on evidence of the June letters, the
trial judge in Case No. 131 withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a guilty plea
against Hardy in Case No. 131 for the misdemeanor conviction.
The June letters served as the basis for withdrawal of the plea in abeyance and
entry of the guilty plea in Case No. 131, and as the basis for the felony convictions in
Case No. 873.
11 Contrary to the state's assertions, Hardy is not challenging the entry of the plea in
abeyance in Case No. 991200131. (See State's Brief, 16.) Hardy's challenge on appeal
relates to the trial court's ruling that Hardy later violated the protective order when he
21

Prior to the entry ofjudgment in Case No. 131, Hardy presented and fully litigated
the constitutional issues in Case No. 873 as they related to the facts and law in both cases.
The trial judge rejected Hardy's argument. (Case No. 873 at 178:135-42.) Thereafter, the
trial judge entered judgment in both cases, and within 10 days, Hardy filed a motion to
alter or amend in Case No. 131. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(e) (motion to amend), 81(e) (civil
rules apply in a criminal case); (Case No. 131, R. 70-73). The rules allow for such a
motion in order that a trial judge may assess a question of law relating to the entry of
judgment. See Tebbs & Tebbs v. Oliveto, 256 P.2d 699, 701 (Utah 1953). The trial court
was not required to take new evidence on the issue. The court specifically limited its
ruling to the question of law involved.
In Case No. 131, Hardy raised the question of law that was addressed in the companion Case No. 873. He referenced the arguments already presented to the judge, that
the criminal provisions at issue were unconstitutional. (Case No. 131, R. 70-73; see also
Case No. 873, R. 178:135-42.) The argument implicated the Gravned analysis as set forth
above. (See supra, Point II.C.(l)(a); Brief of Appellant, Point II.) The trial court denied
the motion in both cases. (Case No. 131:73; Case No. 873 at 178:135-42.) That ruling
was all that was necessary to properly preserve the issue for appeal in Case No. 131.
sent letters to his children on June 7 and June 24. Based on that determination, the trial
judge withdrew the plea in abeyance and entered a guilty plea against Hardy.
Also, Hardy has consistently maintained that the letters did not constitute a violation of the protective order, where the order did not prohibit Hardy from communicating
with his children. Contrary to the state's assertion, in Case No. 131 Hardy did not enter a
guilty plea with respect to the letters. (See State's Brief, 16 and 18.)
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Since Case Nos. 131 and 873 are companion cases, where the convictions were
entered based on the same facts, and the constitutional arguments were presented to the
same judge, a determination in one case necessarily affects the second. As a matter of
judicial economy and fundamental fairness, the trial court's ruling in Case No. 873 should
be deemed sufficient for preservation of the issues in the companion Case No. 131.
Second, in connection with the state's waiver argument, the state has cited to Rule
12(d), Utah R. Crim. P., and Estate of Covington v. Josephson. 888 P.2d 675 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994), cert denied 910 P.2d 425 (Utah 1995). They are inapplicable.
In Covington, after parties to a civil dispute filed cross motions for summary
judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. Covington, 888 P.2d at 676-77.
Defendants subsequently filed a post-summary-judgment motion to alter or amend, which
the trial court "simply denied." Id. at 678 & n. 5. On appeal, defendants asked this Court
to consider arguments raised in the post-summary-judgment motion. It refused to do so
on the basis that the arguments were untimely below; they were waived. Id at 678.
Covington is inapplicable here, where the trial judge in Hardy's case fully
addressed the merits of Hardy's claims in the companion Case No. 873. Since the
constitutional issues were presented on the same facts and arguments before the same
judge in Case No. 873, they were preserved in Case No. 131.
Also, where the trial court in Covington would be required to take evidence to
resolve the post-summary-judgment motion, here that was not the case. Indeed, since the
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same arguments were raised in Case Nos. 873, the trial judge only had to rule on the
matter in Case No. 131 to preserve the constitutional issues.
With respect to Rule 12(d), Utah R. Crim. P., it provides that failure to "timely
raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at
the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown
may grant relief from such waiver." The state's reliance on Rule 12(d) is misplaced. In
Case No. 131, there was no "trial" and the court did not "set" a time for filing the motion
to amend. Also, good "cause" existed for resolving the constitutional issues in Case No.
131, where they already had been presented on a complete record in the companion case.
Third, the state asserts Hardy waived his constitutional claims in Case No. 131 by
pleading guilty. (State's Brief, 16 and 18.) That is incorrect. See supra, note 11. At all
times relevant, Hardy denied that the letters to the children constituted a violation of the
protective order, and he asked the trial court not to withdraw the plea in abeyance. (Case
No. 131 at 93.) The trial judge rejected Hardy's arguments. (Id.) Hardy's claims are ripe
for review and properly before this Court.
(2) Contrary to the State's Assertion. Hardy Has "Standing."
The state asserts Hardy lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
criminal provisions here because he has not been adversely affected by them. (State's
Brief, Point VI.) That argument lacks merit. See Board of Airport Commissions of L.A.
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 574 (1987) ("Under the First Amendment
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overbreadth doctrine, an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited is
permitted to challenge a statute on its face").
For standing, the supreme court ruled that a litigant must show a nexus between
the statute, the injury suffered, and the relief requested. If a favorable ruling will ease the
litigant's injury, he has standing. State v. Mace. 921 P.2d 1372,1379 (Utah 1996).
Here, Hardy was charged and convicted of intentionally/knowingly violating the
protective order by "contacting" or "communicating" with Courtney either directly or
indirectly. Sections 30-6-4.2(2)(b), (5)(a)(i) and 76-5-108 criminalize a direct/indirect
contact /communication. The state proceeded against Hardy for a criminal conviction
based on those provisions. During trial court proceedings, Hardy challenged the
constitutionality of the provisions that subjected him to criminal liability. Hardy's claims
were rejected. Hardy ultimately was convicted under the vague/overbroad provisions and
ordered to serve a sentence at the Utah State Prison.
In the event this Court strikes the relevant provisions as unconstitutional, Hardy
will be entitled to the entry of an order vacating his criminal convictions. A favorable
ruling will provide Hardy with relief. Hardy has standing to raise the issues. The state's
argument must be rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Brief of Appellant and above, Hardy respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the convictions in Case Nos. 131 and 873.
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